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PAKISTAN’S
BORDER REGION FATA
MARKS AN HISTORICAL
BATTLEGROUND. AS
SUCH, IT IS NOT
SURPRISING THAT THIS
TROUBLED REGION AND
ITS PEOPLE DEVELOPED
AND MAINTAINED UNIQUE
SOCIAL STRUCTURES
eing in ancient times a
gateway for foreign inva-
sions fromwestern-cen-
tral Asia, a frontline not only
during the ‘Great Game’ of
imperial powers played out in
the19thcenturybutalso in the
succeedingconflict during the
coldwarbetweenSoviet-occu-
pied-Afghanistan and US-
allied-Pakistan, and today in
theUS-led‘war against terror’,
Pakistan’s border region FATA
marks an historical battle-
ground. As such, it is not sur-
prising that this troubled
region and its people devel-
oped and maintained unique
social structures.
Consequently, ‘outside pow-
ers,’ in trying to keep this area
with its inhabitants in check,
responded inanextra-ordinary
way to exercise influence.This
finds its most visible expres-
sion with far-reaching conse-
quences in the establishment
of a restrictive, elite-guided
political-administrative system
supported by a complex ‘dra-
conian’ set of laws, the so-
called Frontier Crimes
Regulation (FCR).
Furthermore, it produced not
only a style of governance
which is diametrically oppo-
site to the notion of (liberal)
democracy, but also apolitical
culture which successfully
undermined any substantial
processes of including the
common people in participa-
tory, political decision-making
processes worth the name.
Today critics are claiming that
instead of empowering the
common people, traditional
elites and reactionary hierar-
chical structures have gotten
even more deeply embedded
throughprocessesof inter-elite
negotiations.
To be able to contextualise
such claims one has to shed
more lighton the regionunder
discussion with its socio-eco-
nomic and political-adminis-
trativedeterminants.TheFATA
region is strategically located
between the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border, the
Durand Line (named after
British civil servant Sir
MortimerDurand), in theWest,
the Pakistani province of
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK,
formerly known as North-
West-Frontier Province) in the
North and East, and
Balochistan in the South.
Administratively, FATA isdivid-
ed into two territorial entities:
a conglomerate of seven
Agencies and six areas which
are knownasFrontierRegions
(FR). The FR, namely Bannu,
Dera IsmailKhan,Kohat, Lakki
Marwat, Pehhawar and Tank,
are transition or buffer areas
between the Agencies of FATA
and the so- calledadjunct ‘set-
tledareas/districts’ ofKPK.The
Agencies are namely Bajour,
Khyber, Kurram, Mohmand,
Orakzai, North and South
Waziristan.
The acronym FATA – the
Federally Administered Tribal
Areas – already reveals two
unequivocal and significant
hints:First, regarding thesocial,
ethnic composition of the
respective population -tribes,
primarily Pashthun ones.
Second, that the tribesmenand
their territoriesareunderdirect
control of a central, national
authority. Approximately a
dozen major tribes live in the
FATA, consisting of numerous
sub-tribes divided into clans.
If one takes the sub-divisions
into account, the numbers of
tribesarearound400.The total
population in this region is
approximately four million;
most of them residing in rural
areas, leading to a degree of
urbanisation less than 3 per
cent which is extremely low
taking the more than 27.000
squaremeters (over36percent
ofKPW)and the insignificance
of the agricultural sector into
account. Most important to
mention is that FATA suffers
more or less from the worst
socio-economic conditionsof
all of Pakistan.Despite the fact
that the area is rich in natural
resources like minerals, coal
and other deposits, no inten-
sive efforts havebeenmade to
utilize them for development
of the area. As a result,
Pakistan’s so called ‘tribal belt’
is marked by an extremely
insufficient infrastructure, inef-
fective industry, inadequate
medical care, and an extraor-
dinary lack of job opportuni-
ties for the inhabitants leading
toa flourishing informal shad-
ow economy of smuggling of
weapons and drugs. This, in
return, is furtherdeteriorating
thealready troublesomesecu-
rity situation, andmuch-need-
ed business and investment
activities are avoidingFATAby
moving to the ‘settled district-
s’ and other parts of KPK
(which is also partly encour-
aged by the authorities).
Therefore, hopping on the
Taliban & Co.’s payroll seems
for some as one of the view
optionsavailable.The fact that
about 60 per cent of the tribal
people are living below the
poverty line combined with a
literacy rate below 18 per cent
(which isonlyhalveof theaver-
age in whole KPK province) is
ensuring and simplifying the
recruiting process for the
extremists.
To summarise, the situation
in FATA today is doubtless a
consequence of a mixture of
different factors: its chequered
history and peculiar culture,
colonial legacies, especially the
unique administrative and
political status, aswell aspost-
independence poor gover-
nance by the central govern-
ment. In this context, one
shouldmention thatPakistan’s
establishment is making no
secret out of it, that they
‘inherited’, inotherwords, just
continued theBritishpolitical-
administrative system, name-
ly the divide and rule strategy,
in theFATA.However, themost
important element of the
(British) colonial predecessor,
whichone could call the strat-
egy of ‘carrots and sticks’, got
somehow misinterpreted.
Pakistan, driven by its securi-
ty paradigm that is rooted in
an enduring (paranoid) anxi-
ety, generallyprefers touse the
‘stick’,meaning it is looking for
amilitary insteadof apolitical
solution in areas affected by
militants andviolent conflicts.
Having FATA in mind, this
means that Islamabad’s secu-
rity forces hit the common
tribesmen hard because of
supporting cross-border mili-
tancyand terrorism.But after-
wards, somehow, the estab-
lishment in Islamabad (as
usual) forgot to hand over the
‘carrots’ towards its ‘tribal cit-
izens’, perceivedby significant
elementsof the establishment
as fractious, undisciplined,
primitive, andunable tomain-
tain order. Instead, as already
indicated above, for decades
there were virtually no devel-
opment activities undertaken
and envisaged reforms were
not or only rudimentarily
implemented.Mostprominent
in this direction, is the recent
FATA Local Government
Regulation (LGR) 2012 passed
by the national government.
Meant to calm the situation
andhelp theFATAstandatpar
withother areasby restructur-
ing the inhibiting colonial sys-
tem of governance and the
introduction of participative,
democratic elements, this
reform attempt evoked grave
concern.
Because until today/then,
the president of Pakistan
directly administers the FATA
through the governor of KPK
and his appointed political
agents in the Agencies (the FR
were headed by district coor-
dination officer/DCO of the
adjacent settled district) who
are actually in charge of the
decision-making. However,
besides the fact that political
agents were representing the
supreme authority, they were
never able to simply order
something themselveswithout
provoking (violent) resistance.
It was always a common
understanding that a political
outcome has to be negotiated
between the state and the
tribes. Therefore, the political
agents are empowered to
coerce tribesmen through
bribes and threats or granting
and holding back national
resources.However, doubtless
nothing happens in the area
without coordination and
accordance of the local lead-
ership. In sum, the grip of any
outside rule in the region has
never been strong or unchal-
lenged. In order to tackle this
problem, Pakistan continued
-slightlymodified- thecolonial
oppressivearrangementwhich
narrowed down the decision-
making process only to view
stakeholders: thePakistangov-
ernment represented by the
political agents and the so
called Maliks which got iden-
tified among the tribal elders
and/or chieftains.
This is gaining momentum
since it is not only giving the
tribesmuchautonomybutalso
is strengthening the Maliks
position towards their own
people, disturbing the tradi-
tional system of authority of
the Pashtuns. Given the sense
for egalitarian equality within
the Pashtun tribal society
flanked by the concept of
Pashtunwali (tribal code of
honor and behaviour), tradi-
tionally the Maliks were seen
as primus inter pares (the first
among equals) but not as
supreme leader. This creates
anunderstandingof leadership
which is different from other
tribal societies inPakistan, like
in Balochistan were basically
the tribal chiefs (Sardars) are
able toclaimgreaterpower.But
the further entrenchment of
the colonial system of ‘divide
and rule with proxies’ deep-
ened the growing alliance
between the outside forces,
now represented through
Pakistan’s administrative offi-
cials and the Maliks as the
selected and privileged repre-
sentatives of the whole tribes-
men. As a result, the common
people in FATA not only lost
increasingly theaccess topolit-
ical participation but also got
more dependent on the tribal
leadership represented by the
Maliks. Later ones were espe-
cially benefitting through the
century-old FCR (first intro-
duced in 1901) which consti-
tutes FATA’s judicial system–a
hybrid body - which allows
local customary laws and tra-
ditional tribal Jirgas (council of
handpicked elders) to prevail
in tandemwith representatives
of thecentral government.This
system made sure that all
issuesof significancebetween
the tribes and the Pakistani
state were managed through
interactionbetween theMaliks
and thePoliticalAgents (which
were backed the Frontier
Constabulary force/Police,
Levies and Khassadars/tribal
militias, FrontierCorps/Army).
Additionally it granted the
tribes substantial autonomy in
their own affairs, in which the
Maliks, appeared increasingly
notonly as sole interlocutor in
state-policymakingbutalsoas
de facto arbiters in local con-
flicts as well as heads of sever-
al councils and jirgas.
In consequence, neither the
national legislative can play a
role in the respective regional
affairs nor is FATA a subject to
rulings by national or provin-
cial courts, unless Pakistan’s
president so desires. The fact,
that until 1996 members of
Parliament for FATA were not
elected but appointed by the
Maliksunderpins their extraor-
dinary power.
However, instead of estab-
lishing an empowered local
administration in order to
include the common tribes-
men inpoliticaldecision-mak-
ing, understood here as a pre-
condition for any democratic
transition, all reforms and
amendments regarding FATA
until now, especially the latest
FATA LGR 2012, turned out to
worsen the situation by rein-
forcing the statusquo. Inother
words, there is a lack of politi-
cal will or lack of capability to
change the power structure in
FATAwhich formally rest in the
PA and informally in the
Maliks.Doubtless, the current
political status of FATA and its
inhabitants are against the
country constitution and are
not in line with the UN’s gen-
eral principles and resolutions
regarding human rights. The
imposedsystemofgovernance
lacks tremendously accounta-
bility and transparency.
Furthermore, the elected rep-
resentatives still remain pow-
erlessbecauseall authority got
concentratedwithin thepolit-
ical administration in thename
of governor and its political
agents. The fact, that political
parties were banned from
operating in theregionwas fur-
ther limiting the option for
political participation.
Additional, the restriction in
party competition were given
Islamist parties and religious
hardlinersapredominantposi-
tion in form of a monopoly in
publicopinionmaking.Thesit-
uationofbeingdeprivedofany
substantial constitutional,
political andcivic rights aswell
as any legal protections
through the country judiciary
made the tribesnot onlymore
rigidandconservativebut also
turned their FATA into a per-
sistent flashpoint.
Having this in mind, it does
not come by surprise that the
‘balance and harmony’ with-
in this autocratic governance
system was disturbed by the
emergence of new, ‘anti-sys-
temicactors’. Latest in theafter-
math of the military actions
against the Taliban in
Afghanistan, FATA become an
ideal hatch for Taliban and
other militants like Haqqani
network,Hekmatyar group, or
Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan. But not only for
‘foreign militants’ also for
‘domestic displaced terrorist-
s’, FATA is a safe haven, espe-
cially for those who had to
move out from Pakistan-con-
trolled-Kashmir because of
internationalpressure inorder
to reduce tensions with India.
But Islamabad is paying an
increasing prize in terms of
human life and material
resources for ignoring and/or
allowing the‘Talibanization’ of
its Tribal belt. Instead of serv-
ing as a buffer between
Afghanistan’s and Pakistan
Pashtun tribes or functioning
asastrategic tool for Islamabad
againstKabul, theTalibanand
sympathisers in FATA are (re-
)inventing themselves as
‘Pakistan Taliban’. With a new
generationof leadersand fight-
ers, largely recruitedamongthe
alienated Pashtun tribes, they
turned effectively against
Islamabad and its over-
whelmed and overstrained
securityapparatus. In this con-
text one should mention, that
‘PakistanTaliban’ remainspart-
lyasamisnomer, since it seems
obvious that they are looking
beyond FATA regarding the
establishment of a theocratic
Emirate based on their dis-
criminatory, suppressive, and
inhuman notions of state and
society rooting in a distorted
interpretation of Islam. This
has serious security implica-
tions not only for the ‘Af-Pak
region’ but for neighboring
India and Iran too. Here, the
2008 attack on Mumbai by
Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, a terrorist
groupwhichhadnever turned
against Islamabad, must be
seennot only as an attempt to
undermine India-Pakistanrap-
prochements but also as sup-
port for theTaliban in FATAby
binding Pakistan troops at the
eastern border.
Islamabad’s security circles,
for years lackinga clear count-
er-terrorist strategy in FATA,
engaged in a plethora of mili-
tary actions with militants,
from, half-hearted skirmishes
to full-scale battle scenarios
over the last decade. After
numerous defeats, few dubi-
ous victories, and a parade of
failedpeace-treaties, today the
situation is still notunder con-
trol andPakistan’smilitary top
brasshas finally cometorecog-
nise that it is atwarwith its for-
mer‘brothers-in-arms’. Incon-
sequence, the on-going use of
coercive force by all combat-
ants involved -including US
Drone strikes - is further alien-
ating the affected tribesmen
from the Pakistani state and
the international community,
especially theUS.Withnocred-
ible efforts of integratingFATA
into thePakistani statewithall
necessary constitutional and
legal ramifications, like grant-
ing fundamental rights and a
democraticorder, the tribalbelt
will remain a lawless hotbed
andsanctuary for Jihadistof all
colors.
To summarise, Islamabad
lost once again a window of
opportunity to improvegover-
nance and socio-economic
conditions in a part of the
country’s ‘periphery’. Instead
ofusing thepost-war scenario
after the large scale military
operations andormoreor less
stalemate for the introduction
of sufficient democratic
reforms, Islamabaddecided to
re-establish and consolidate
the colonial administrative-
political system and judiciary
which not only set the FATA
apart fromthe rest ofPakistan,
butalsomadetheregiontoone
of the country most underde-
veloped regions. In other
words, since Pakistan came
into existence no serious
endeavourwere carriedout to
improve the living standard,
neither in socio-economicnor
in political terms, of the tribal
people.
Subsequently, for the sakeof
practical purposes, lawless-
ness, ignoranceof thecommon
people indecision-makingand
disrespect of human rights is
continuing. Due to the
appeasement policy of
Islamabad’s security nexus,
FATA is not even a ‘no-man’s
land’ - as statedby some inter-
national critics and reports-
since it seems that theTaliban
and(other) localmilitantshave
kept a tight hold of this region
and increasingly onneighbor-
ing areas. The recent killing of
seniorminister Bashir Ahmed
Bilour ina suicidebombingon
December 22, 2012 in or the
killing of 21 Levies a couple of
days later nearby Peshawar
showsonceagain thatTehreek-
e-TalibanPakistan’s (TTP) and
associatedmilitant groups are
able to challenge Pakistan’s
stateandsocietywhereverand
whenever it likes to in order to
undermine any democratic
principles and to establish a
Sharia-based theocratic-fun-
damentalist state.
The writer is a lecturer of
Political Science and
International Relations as well
as a senior research fellow in
the Department of Political
Science, South Asia Institute,
Heidelberg University.
SIEGFRIED O.
WOLF
Want to
contribute?
at.independent
@gmail.com
ocial spending schemes
can take various forms.
They can either be pro-
vided as subsidised goods
suchasgasoline, cookinggas,
food, fertilizer, etc. Or they
canbeprovidedasdirectcash
transfers to beneficiaries. In
India, most social spending
has been in the form of sub-
sidised goods available at
government ration shops.
Thus people who have been
identified as recipients (for
example those below the
poverty line) can buy sub-
sidised necessities directly
from these shops. However,
this system that has been in
place for decades has led to
multiple inefficiencies.
Subsidised goods have been
diverted only to be sold at
market prices.Not onlyhave
the intended recipients not
beenable tobuymuchneed-
ed supplies at the subsidised
prices, but intermediaries
have illegally benefited from
such diversions and made a
financial killing. At the same
time such actions have put
needlesspressureon thegov-
ernment subsidybillwithout
meeting the social goals such
subsidies were meant to
meet.
Inorder to stemthese leak-
ages andputa lidon thebur-
geoning subsidy bill, the
Indian government has
decided to gradually phase
out this system of subsidies
and move to cash subsidies
instead. The cash transfer
scheme that will gradually
replace various subsidies on
fuel, fertilizer, etc., is sup-
posed to be introduced in
January 2013 in 51 districts.
Pilot programmeshavebeen
in place for the past year to
test themodalitiesof shifting
to cash transfers and these
pilots have brought to light
several problems that will
prevent a smooth transition
fromsubsidies to cash trans-
fers.
The problems that have
been highlighted have also
given sufficient ammunition
to the opposition to vehe-
mentlyoppose theproposed
cash subsidy project. The
largest opposition party
(Bharatiya Janata Party) has
beencryingout that theproj-
ect is being introduced as a
poll gimmick, which will aid
the incumbent in the gener-
al elections due to be held in
2014.
Thegovernment’serstwhile
ally theTrinamulCongress is
also opposed to this ambi-
tiousprogrammeongrounds
of logistics. It is their con-
tention and rightly so, that
there are insufficient banks
and post offices to execute
the transfersandasignificant
proportion of the intended
beneficiaries is unbanked.
That is, the beneficiaries do
not have accounts either in
banks or post offices. How
then, will they receive cash
subsidies?Nonetheless, there
has been a mad scramble to
ensure that each household
in the 51 districts of the first
phase will have a bank
account by January 2013.
So thegovernment is actu-
ally going ahead with cash
transfers in lieu of goods.
However, there are still a
number of issues which
should be considered and
addressed before the pro-
gramme is rolled out in the
entire country. Several coun-
tries alreadyhavecash trans-
fer programmes in place.
However, in most of these
existing programmes, the
cash transfer is made to the
beneficiaryonlyoncondition
that he/she meets certain
conditions inorder to receive
the cash. Such programmes
are known as conditional
cash transfers. They have
been found to be extremely
successful in many nations
and have actually met the
social goals that they were
intended for.
In Pakistan, the Punjab
Female Stipend Programme
provides cash to poor fami-
lies on condition of enrol-
ment and attendance of girl
children in school.
Bangladesh too, has a simi-
lar programme which has
ensured high rates of atten-
dance of girls at the second-
ary school level.Manyexam-
ples from around the world
can be given of such suc-
cessful cash transfer pro-
grammes that have actually
benefited the recipient and
at thesametimemet the larg-
er socio-economic develop-
ment goals they were
designed for. The main
rationale for taggingoncon-
ditions to cash transfer pro-
grammes is that for various
reasons (be it poverty or lack
of information) parents can
under-invest in their children
especially girl children.
Attachingconditionsensures
that adequate investment is
made in merit goods.
But, are the same socio-
economic goals achieved
with cash transfers that are
unconditional such as the
scheme being rolled out in
India? In such programmes,
the recipientof the cash sub-
sidy is free to spendanddoes
not have to meet any crite-
ria.Thus, the recipient could
deliberately not invest in
human capital activities
which could ultimately pull
the family out of poverty.
There is another perverse
logic to not investing in
humancapital formationand
increasing earning abilities,
as this would mean that
recipients will no longer be
eligible for benefits.
Moreover, if benefits are
unconditional, then benefi-
ciaries prefer to have their
children work in the labour
market, rather than enrol
them in school.They tend to
focus on the short termben-
efits of their child working
and contributing to family
income, rather than thinking
about the benefits that the
child could derive – namely,
higher income – from being
better educated.
Some sceptics also argue
that beneficiaries do not act
responsibly. It is quite possi-
ble that the cash received is
frittered away on demerit
goods suchasalcohol, rather
than being used to purchase
food or kerosene or whatev-
er else the cash subsidy may
be in lieu of. This argument
hasalsobeencited frequently
by the opposition in India
when critiquing the uncon-
ditional cash transfer pro-
gram that the government is
planning to roll out come
2013.
However, the main argu-
ment in support of uncondi-
tional cash transfer pro-
grammes is the efficiencies
that it will generate. First of
all, targetingof recipientswill
improve. Second the pilfer-
age of subsidised rice, fuel,
etc., will stop.
Therefore, governments
realize substantial cost sav-
ings. Lastly, the huge advan-
tage is that of bringing a vast
numberofunbankedpeople
into the formal banking sys-
tem. A related advantage is
the rapid development of
infrastructure, bothphysical
and financial, to ensure the
successful implementation
of such a programme.
Yes, there are shortcom-
ings in this move towards
provision of cash subsidies
instead of subsidised goods.
However, thedirect and indi-
rect benefits that cash trans-
fers (conditional or uncon-
ditional) generate ultimate-
ly do more good than bad.
The author is a former eco-
nomics advisor, UNDP
Bangladesh, and holds doc-
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University of Massachusetts
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